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We investigate the international transmission of the credit crisis triggered by the 
Lehman default in September 2008 using Japan’s stock market data. Using 
cumulative returns (CR) during the crisis, starting from the day of Lehman’s default 
and lasting until the day prior to the news of the TARP capital injection, we find that 
CR is negatively correlated with the export-to-sales ratio, the loan-to-asset ratio, and 
the share owned by foreign investors. Once controlling for market risk, however, 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the same period shows a different picture. 
CAR is not negatively correlated with export shares or the share owned by foreign 
investors, which implies that neither trade channels nor portfolio-rebalancing by 
foreigners are unique characteristics of the crisis, but can be observed in normal 
downturns. We find that CAR is negatively correlated with the loan-to-asset ratio, 
suggesting that market participants were worried about the credit crunch. We also 
find that CAR is negatively correlated with the shares of exports to North America 
and Asia after controlling for total exports, suggesting that the composition of export 
destination matters. Finally, we find that the concentration of export destination is 
also relevant. 
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1.  Introduction 
The US credit crisis triggered by the subprime loan debacle in 2007 and 
culminated by the Lehman default in September 2008 was quickly transmitted 
beyond borders, becoming the global crisis. Foreign financial institutions, especially 
those European banks that held US toxic assets were severely affected by the sharp 
drop in their prices. However, the transmission was far wider and deeper than just 
through the asset price collapse or the liquidity dry-up in the financial market. 
Japanese financial institutions incurred relatively small losses from the 
subprime-related assets. Total realized losses of depository institutions from 
sub-prime mortgage securities over the period from April 2007 through March 2009 
were just 2.1 percent of total Tier 1 capital.1  Nonetheless, as Figure 1 depicts, Japan’s 
stock market index (TOPIX) fell as much as the US, Euro, and Asian’s stock market 
indices (the Standard and Poor’s 500, its Euro, and its Asia 50, respectively). Figures 
2A and 2B shows that Industrial production and real GDP dropped by one of the 
largest rates in the world. We investigate the transmission of the 2008 credit crisis to 
the Japanese economy using the event-study methodology. 
 Various transmission mechanisms of financial crises can be classified into trade 
and financial linkages. Trade linkages include the bilateral trade with the crisis-hit 
area and the competition in the third market through the change in exchange rates. 
Financial linkages work through the liquidity dry-up in financial markets, the credit 
crunches by financial intermediaries, and the portfolio rebalance by crisis-hit 
investors. 
 The event-study methodology with firm-level data is expected to distinguish the 
importance of those various channels (Forbes, 2004). In addition, since Japan’s 
financial institutions incur relatively small losses from securities products, we can 
focus on the channels through the sustained stress in the international financial 
markets or through the depressed demand for exporting goods in foreign markets. If 
abnormal returns of exporting firms were lower than non-exporting firms, trade 
channels are of importance. On the other hand, if firms with abundant liquid assets or 
small amounts of loans saw higher abnormal returns, then liquidity and credit 
channels are of relevance. Finally, if firms whose shares are held more by crisis-hit 
foreign investors went through lower abnormal returns, then the fire-sales or 
                                                  
1  Realized losses and Tier 1 capital are 1.0 and 4.8 trillion yen, respectively. Total valuation 
losses and realized losses from securitized products, including sub-prime mortgage securities, 
CLO, CDO, RMBS, CMBS, and leveraged loans, are 3.3 trillion yen, or 6.9 percent of Tier 1 
capital. (Financial Service Agency, 2009) 3 
 
portfolio-rebalance channels are working. 
In analyzing stock market performance, it is useful to distinguish cumulative 
returns (CR, without market-risk adjustment) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR, with market-risk adjustment). Suppose, for example, that exporters are more 
sensitive to market returns (with high   ). Even if exporters’ CR were lower than 
non-exporters during the crisis, such exporters’ poor performance may not be unique 
to the crisis period, but could be observed in normal downturns. In that case, 
exporters’ CAR would not be low. Since we are interested in how the transmission 
mechanism of the crisis is different from that of normal times, we mainly focus on 
CAR, though we examine CR as well. 
    There is vast literature on the international transmission of financial crises. One 
strand of literature examines the correlation among different economies in interest 
rates, stock prices and sovereign spreads to see whether the correlation increases in 
the wake of a crisis (see Forbes and Rigobon (2001) for a survey). Though most of the 
studies find an increase in correlation in asset returns after the crisis, it is often 
difficult to distinguish between the international transmission of the crises and the 
correlation of economic fundamentals using time series data (Dornbusch et al., 2000)2. 
Another strand of literature, introduced by Eichgengreen et al. (1996) and Sachs et al. 
(1996), examines whether the likelihood of crisis in a country is higher after a crisis in 
other countries (see Dornbusch et al. (2000) for surveys). Though, in principle, those 
studies can identity trade and financial channels using a cross-country dataset, it is 
actually difficult to do so, since countries are often closely connected both by trade and 
financial ties. Partly because of such a high correlation between trade and financial 
ties, previous studies obtain mixed results about the relative importance of trade and 
financial channels3. To identify the transmission mechanism, it is useful to use 
firm-level data, which contain a large variation in the exposures to trade and financial 
shocks. Forbes (2004) utilizes firm-level data during the Asian and Russian crises and 
finds that trade linkages are important factors4.  
                                                  
2  Forbes and Rigobon (2002) also point out the heteroskedasticity-driven bias associated with 
the correlation coefficient. For a recent study, see Dungey and Martin (2007), among others. 
3  Eichengreen et al. (1996) examine 20 industrial economies from 1959 through 1993 and show 
that trade linkages were important. Glick and Rose (1998) also find that trade linkages were 
important by examining five episodes of currency crises and 161 countries. On the other hand, 
Baig and Goldfajn (1998) find that trade linkages among East Asian countries were weak. 
Mason (1998) also claims that trade was not a significant transmission mechanism in the 
Mexican and Thai crises. Kaminski and Reinhart (2000) support the financial channel in the 
Asian crisis (through Japanese major banks as a common creditor). Frankel and Schmukler 
1998) analyze the closed-end country funds data and find that the Mexican crisis produced 
spillover effects which were less strong in Asia than in Latin America. 
4  Some other studies examine capital flows (e.g., Froot et al., 2001) or the portfolio of mutual 4 
 
Some recent papers study the international transmission of the recent global 
credit crisis using cross-country data. Interestingly, they do not find evidence of 
significant transmission that was often observed in previous crises. Evidences from 
Rose and Spiegel (2009) do not support trade or finance linkages. Kamin and Demarco 
(2010) do not find a financial channel on CDS spreads, suggesting that the US 
subprime crisis may have been a mere trigger for a global bank run. We examine the 
international transmission of the 2008 crisis using firm-level data.   
        The composition of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present our 
hypotheses on the transmission mechanism of financial crises. In Sections 3 and 4, we 
describe our dataset and the event window we choose. In Section 5, we show the 
graphs and descriptive statistics of the cumulative returns (CR) and the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) during the window. In Sections 6 and 7, we present our 
estimation results for CR and CAR, respectively. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  Hypotheses 
Transmission mechanisms of financial crises can be classified into trade and 
financial linkages. We find it useful to further divide the financial channels into 
liquidity, credit, and portfolio-rebalance effects, though they are often interrelated 
with each other.   
 
A.  Trade Linkages 
Trade linkages work through the following three channels. First, as the crisis-hit 
foreign market falls into recession, import demand in that market decreases through 
the income effect. Second, if the currency of crisis-hit area depreciates, import demand 
both in the crisis-hit market and the third market decreases through the price effect. 
Finally, devaluation in the crisis-hit country may put devaluating pressure on those 
currencies that do not float freely, especially when those countries compete in the 
third markets. Such competitive devaluations may result in capital outflows from 
those countries. Preceding studies find evidence supporting some kinds of trade 
linkages (e.g., Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1996; Glick and Rose, 1998; Forbes, 
2004) 5 
We use three kinds of variables to capture the trade linkages. The simplest one we 
use is the export dummy that takes one if the firm exports and zero otherwise. Next, 
we use total export shares in total sales to distinguish the degree of the exposure to 
                                                                                                                                                
funds (e.g., Kaminsky et al., 2004) to investigate the financial linkages. 
5  Lahiri and Vegh (2003), however, find evidence against “contagion through competitive 
devaluation.” 5 
 
trade shocks among exporting firms. Next, the share of exports to Northern America 
in total exports captures the bilateral income and competition effects from the US. We 
also use the share of other markets in total exports to capture the relative importance 
of income and price effects from those markets. 
Figures 2A and 2B suggest that income effects are stronger for exports to Europe, 
while, as Figure 3 depicts, Japanese firms lost price competitiveness first in Asian 
markets (except for China) and later in the US, China, and Europe due to the 
appreciation of yen against those currencies 
 
B.  Financial Linkages through Liquidity 
The liquidity linkages work if financial institutions that incur losses from foreign 
assets may be forced to sell illiquid assets at an unusually low price (Adrian and Shin, 
2008). Such a fire-sale dries up domestic asset markets, depresses asset prices further, 
and makes firm funding difficult. The liquidity shortage and asset price falls will 
reduce firm investment. Some empirical studies found evidence of increased 
correlation in asset returns after financial crises, suggesting the existence of liquidity 
linkages (Calvo and Reinhart,1996; Baig and Goldfajn, 1999). In Japan, as Figures 4A 
and 4B illustrate, the issuance of commercial papers and corporate bonds decreased 
temporarily after the Lehman default, indicating that liquidity in those markets 
temporarily dried up. 
 We use the liquid asset-to-sales ratio as a rough measure of the resilience to the 
shortage in funding liquidity. In addition, we use the corporate bond and commercial 
paper dummies that take unity if the firm has positive corporate bond and commercial 
paper outstanding, respectively, as the susceptibility of the liquidity dry-up effect of 
financial markets. 
     
C.  Financial Linkages through Credit 
  If financial intermediaries that incurred losses from problem assets shrink their 
lending, their client firms will be adversely affected. Even non-hit intermediaries may 
cut lending if the market liquidity is dried up and they face difficulty in raising 
short-term debt. There are some evidences that support a negative international 
transmission of the shock to foreign banks’ balance sheets (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 
1997; Popov and Udell, 2010). On the other hand, financial institutions that suffer 
little from foreign assets may increase loans to their client firms that face liquidity 
shortage.  
 In Japan, credits from foreign lenders are scarce, so that direct credit crunches 
from foreign crisis-hit intermediaries were not likely to affect Japanese firms severely. 6 
 
In addition, Japanese banks incurred little losses from sub-prime-related securities 
and other securitized products. On the other hand, Japanese banks incurred losses 
from the sharp drops of stock prices as they held a significant share of their client 
firms’ stocks. Figure 5 shows, however, that at an aggregate level,  Japanese banks 
increased loans after the Lehman default in response to the liquidity dry-up in 
commercial paper and corporate bond markets . 
We use loan-to-asset ratio to capture the effects through bank loans, which may 
be positive or negative. As the borrowing ratio is higher, firms are more likely to be 
affected by banks’ credit fluctuations. 
        Finally, we investigate the possibility of a shrink in trade finance that firms need 
from financial intermediaries when they export. Chor and Manova (2010) point out 
the importance of trade finance in influencing international trade patterns during the 
global crisis6. Since no direct measure of trade credit was available, we use the 
intersection of the export dummy and the short-term loans-to-asset ratio. The idea is 
that as firms export and at the same time depend more on short-term borrowings, 
they are more susceptible to the shrink in trade credit. 
 
D.  Financial Linkages through Portfolio-Rebalance 
  The portfolio-rebalance linkages work if crisis-hit investors sell stocks and other 
risky assets either to reduce asset risk, to obtain liquidity for collateral or haircuts. 
For example, capital outflow by mutual funds was attributed to the international 
transmission of the Asian financial crisis (Kaminsky et al., 2004) 7 . Such 
portfolio-rebalance or fire-sales will directly depress stock prices even if firm 
operating performance is not affected. 
Considering that Japanese financial institutions incur relatively small anounts of   
losses, we neglect the portfolio-rebalance of Japanese banks and focus on that of 
foreign investors. We use the share owned by foreign investors as a proxy of the 
portfolio-rebalance channels. 
 Figure 6 depicts sales net of purchases by foreigners, domestic individuals, and 
domestic corporations, showing that foreigners continued to be a net seller over the six 
months after the Lehman shock.     
 
                                                  
6  Amiti and Weinstein (2009) find that trade finance accounts for about one-third 
of the decline in Japanese exports in the financial crises of the 1990s. 
7  Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) provide evidence that spillovers through bank lending 
can help explain the transmission of the Mexican, Thai, and Russian crises after controlling for 
the degree of trade competition and macroeconomic fundamentals, but their results are not 
robust in the case of the Asian crises.   7 
 
3.  Data 
We combine the stock return data with financial statements and firm activity 
data. For the stock return, we refer to Stock Price CD-ROM published by Toyo Keizai 
Shimpo-sha. Financial statements are obtained from NEEDS-CGES published by 
Nikkei Media Marketing and Corporate Financial Databank published by 
Development Bank of Japan. Information on firm activities, including exports, is 
obtained from Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structures and Activities 
(BSJBSA), published by Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. We use the 
pre-crisis firm characteristics variables, typically as of March 2008.   
The number of the stock return data we can obtain from Stock Price CD-ROM is 
3215. After the stock return data is linked to the BSJBSA and Corporate Financial 
Databank to get information about firms' exports and financial statements, the size of 
sample becomes 1841. Data appendix provides a more detailed description of the data 
set. 
 
4.  Event Windows 
Two major events occurred in the fall of 2008. On September 15 (September 16 in 
Japan) Lehman Brother Holdings announced that it would file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection. On September 29 (September 30 in Japan), the legislation of 
bailout (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008) failed at the United State 
House of Representatives. 
If the market fully understood the impacts of those events instantaneously, we 
should choose each one day as an event window. However, in the case of 
unprecedented events like the crisis, market participants may understand them 
gradually. In addition, new information on the severity of a crisis is likely to be 
continuously provided (Forbes, 2004).   
Figure 1 depicts S&P 500, showing that while Lehman’s failure induced only a 
temporary fall in US stock prices, the bill failure caused a persistent drop, which 
continued until the US government announced revisions in TARP (Troubled Asset 
Relief Program) to warrant the nine US major financial institutions on October 14. 
The persistent declining trend after the bill failure suggests that markets realized the 
impacts and severity of the crisis gradually. 
To take into consideration this possibility, we choose relatively long windows. 
Specifically, we choose 18 operating days from the day of the Lehman default 
(September 16 (date 1) to October 10 (date 18) in Japan time). We chose the ending 
day considering that news about TARP equity plan was leaked on October 13, though 8 
 
it was formally released on the following day8. We also divide the window into the first 
9 operating days (September 16 to September 29) and the last 9 operating days 
(September 30 to October 10).   
 
5.  Graphical Preview 
We divide the sample firms into four kinds of two subgroups based on whether 
each of the key variables (export-to-sales ratio, liquidity-to-asset ratio, loan-to-asset 
ratio, share of foreigners) is higher or lower than the median, and preview their stock 
market performance in terms of the cumulative returns (CR, without risk adjustment) 
in Figure 7 and the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR, with risk adjustment) in 
Figure 8 over the window. Because about half of the firms are non-exporters and the 
median of export share is zero, we divide the sample firms into exporters and 
non-exporters. We describe in details how we adjusted the market risk in Section 7. 
Some interesting facts can be observed. 
 First, exporting firms tended to perform worse than non-exporters in terms of 
CR. On the other hand, in terms of CAR, exporting firms were first outperformed by 
non-exporters, but eventually overturned them. Risk adjustment accounts for such a 
difference. As we see below, stock returns of exporters are more sensitive to market 
index (i.e., with higher   ), suggesting that their prices drop more than stock prices of 
non-exporters during downturns. Such a difference in the sensitivity can be observed 
in normal times (we estimate   using pre-crisis data). Once we control for this 
difference, we find that exporters outperformed non-exporters in the last phase of the 
window. 
  Second, liquidity did not significantly matter for the performance of CR or CAR. 
 Third, firms with high loan-to-asset ratios tended to perform initially better but 
later worse both in terms of CR and CAR. 
 Finally, firms owned more by foreign investors performed worse in terms of CR, 
while they performed initially worse and later better in terms of CAR. Again, risk 
adjustment accounts for the difference; stock returns owned more by foreigners are 
more sensitive to the market index. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the medians of CA and CAR, respectively, for each of the 
subgroups over the entire window. The CR of exporters is lower than those of 
non-exporters by 4.9 percent, while the CAR of exporters is higher than non-exporters 
                                                  
8  See, e.g., Reuter news. Beltratti and Stultz (2009) also examine cumulative stock returns of 
financial institutions for the periods of the entire credit crisis from July 1, 2007 to December 31, 
2008 and the Lehman bankruptcy month from September 12 to October 10, 2008. Erkens et al. 
(2009) investigate cumulative stock returns of financial institutions around the world from the 
first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2008. 9 
 
by 2.8 percent. The differences of CR and CAR between liquidity-rich firms and 
liquidity-scarce firms are not statistically significant. The CR and CAR of firms with 
high loan-to-asset ratios are lower than firms with low loan-to-asset ratios by 4.2 
percent and 1.1 percent, respectively. The CR of firms owned more by foreigners is 
lower than firms owned less by foreigners by 2.5 percent, while the CAR of the former 
is higher than the latter by 5.8 percent.   
It should be noted that we just look at the bivariate relationship between the firm 
characteristics and CR or CAR in this section. To examine the marginal effects of each 
firm characteristics variable, we conduct regression analyses below. 
     
6.  Cumulative Returns 
 We first regress the cumulative stock returns (CR) on the firm’s trade and 
financial variables. Though this approach ignores the market risk factor and as such 
is not appropriate to event studies, it captures casual observations. Later we 
demonstrate how the results will change once we take into consideration the market 
risk factor. 
Let  it R  denote the period-t return for stock i, and  it CR  the cumulative stock 
return over the c-day window. Assuming that no dividend or other cash flow to 















CR , where  it P   denotes the stock price of firm  i  at  period t  and  period  0 
denotes one day prior to the window 9.Let  TRADE denote the trade variables, 
LIQUIDITY the liquidity variables, CREDITthe credit variables, and PORTFOLIO 
the portfolio-rebalance variables. Then, our first regression is   
(1)  i i i i i i u PORTFOLIO CREDIT LIQUIDITY TRADE CR       4 3 2 1 0       
for  n i ,... 1  , 





i it R CR
1 
 if  it P   exists for all  c ,..., 2 , 1   . In reality, however, some stock price data are 







CR . Another way to 
handle the missing data would be to assume that the missing day’s price were the same as the 
price on the last day when actual data is available. This alternative method yields almost the 
same result as we obtained below. 10 
 
where  i u   is the disturbance term.   
Table 3a shows the estimation result for the entire window. In Column 1, we use 
the export dummy as TRADE, the liquidity-to-asset ratio as LIQUIDITY, the 
loan-to-asset ratio as CREDIT, and the share owned by foreign investors as 
PORTFOLIO. The export dummy is significantly negative with the absolute value of 
4.1 percent. The liquidity ratio is not significant. The loan ratio is significantly 
negative, with the absolute value of 8.4 percent. The share of foreign investors is 
significantly negative with the absolute value of 6.3 percent. Those results for CR are 
consistent with the trade, credit, trade finance, and portfolio-rebalance hypotheses, 
but it should be noted that we do not control for the market risk factor. 
To further explore the liquidity channel, we add the corporate bond and 
commercial paper (CP) dummies in Column 2, finding that neither is significant.   
In Column 3, we further investigate the trade channel by adding the two 
variables: the intersection of the export dummy and the share of exports in total sales, 
and the intersections of the export dummy and the shares of major export destinations 
in total exports. The intersection of the export dummy and the share of exports, which 
captures the exposure of trade shocks among exporters. is significantly negative with 
the absolute value of 7.3 percent. The intersections of the export dummy and the 
shares of major export destinations capture the difference in the demand for Japanese 
goods. In our dataset, export destination is divided into seven areas: Asia, Middle-East, 
Europe, North America, Middle and South America, Africa, and Oceania, of which we 
pick up the three major destinations: Asia, North America, and Europe. We find that 
no export destination share is significant. 
Next we examine whether or not the concentration of export destination matters. 
Among the firms whose export destination is one area, 90 percent of them export to 
Asia and 5 percent to North America. In Column 4, we add the four dummies that take 
unity if the firm exports to one, two, three and four or more areas. The coefficients on 
those dummies are all significantly negative but not in a monotonic way. In Column 5 
we add the Herfindahl Index of export destination,, finding that the Index is not 
significant.  
Finally, in Column 6, we examine the trade finance channel by adding the 
intersection of the export dummy and short-term loans-to-asset ratio to the baseline 
specification, obtaining that the intersection term is negative and significant. 
Tables 3b and 3c show the estimation results for the two sub-period windows, 
respectively. The first window covers the 9 operating days from the Lehman default 
prior to the bill failure. The last window covers the 9 operating days from the bill 11 
 
failure prior to the news of TARP capital injection. The export dummies and the 
export shares are significantly negative in both periods. No regional export share is 
significant in either period. The number of export destination does not show any 
monotonic effect and the Herfindahl Index is not significant in either period. The 
liquid asset ratio is significantly positive in the first half period, but significantly 
negative for the last half period. The corporate bond and CP dummies are not 
significant in either period. The loan-to-asset ratio and the intersection term of the 
loan ratio and export dummy are significantly negative only in the last period. The 
share of foreign investors is significantly negative only for the first half period.   
 
7.  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
7.1 Methodology 
We have not adjusted the market risk of stock returns so far. Suppose, for example, 
that exporting firms tend to be more sensitive to the market return. The stock returns 
of such firms perform worse than the market return when the latter is negative. So, 
we may find that exporting firms tend to perform worse during the crisis. But this is a 
usual observation and not necessarily particular to the event we are interested in. We 
are interested in the special effect of the crisis on stock returns. For this purpose, we 
have to look at abnormal returns, which are adjusted for the market risk. To this aim, 
we follow the standard event-study methodology (e.g., MacKinlay, 1997). 
 First, we estimate the following market model using OLS to obtain normal 
returns during the pre-crisis period. 
(2)                  it mt i i it R R       , for each  n i ,... 1   and  p t ,... 1   
where  it R  denotes the period-t return for stock i,  mt R  the period-t market return, 
and  it    the disturbance term with  0 ) (  it E   and 
2 ) ( i it Var    . Denoting the 








We set the pre-crisis period (of length p) as the 225 days before the crisis period, 
so that the sample period covers October 17, 2007 through September 11, 2008.   
    Next,  we  calculate  abnormal  returns  (ARs) for each stock during the crisis period 
of  c   days as follows. 
(3)                       m i i i i it R R AR ˆ ˆ ˆ      for  c ,... 1   , 
where each of the fitted parameters are estimates of (1).   12 
 
    Then  we  construct  the  cumulative  abnormal returns during the event window as10 






















CAR    
Finally, we regress the CARs on the firm’s trade, liquidity, credit, and 
portfolio-rebalance variables. 
(5)     i i i i i i PORTFOLIO CREDIT LIQUIDITY TRADE CAR             4 3 2 1 0  
for  n i ,... 1  , 
where  i    is the disturbance term. 
 
7.2 Results 
     Before  looking  at  the  estimation  results for the CARs, we examine whether there 
is significant difference in    depending on the export and financial variables. Table 
4 shows the descriptive statistics of   . We find that     is higher for exporting firms, 
firms with low loan-to-asset ratios, and firms owned more by foreign investors. Those 
differences in   may yield some different results between CR and CAR, as we 
suggested in Section 5. 
    Table 5a presents the estimation results for CAR for the entire window. 
Column 1 shows the baseline specification result. Export dummy is not significant, 
not supporting the trade channel. Even though exporting firms performed worse in 
terms of CR during the crisis, such relative deterioration is normal and not unique to 
the 2008 crisis. The liquid asset ratio is significantly negative, against the liquidity 
channel hypothesis. The loan-to-asset ratio is significantly negative, supporting the 
credit channel hypothesis. Even though Japanese banks incurred little from securities 
products, market participants seem to have worried about credit crunches. The 
foreign investor share is positive and significant, which does not support the fire-sales 
or portfolio-rebalance hypothesis. 
The liquidity channel hypothesis is not supported as, in Column 2, corporate bond 
is positive and marginally significant. 
Though total exports do not matter, export destination seems to matter. In 





i i AR CAR
1 
  if  it P   exists for all  c ,..., 2 , 1   . Because some data of  it P  is  missing, 
we calculate CAR as (4). Assuming that the missing day’s price were the same as the price on 
the last day when actual price data is available, we obtained almost the same results as below.
   13 
 
Column 3, while export dummy and its intersection with the export share are both 
significantly positive, the shares of exports to North America and Asia are 
significantly negative, suggesting that controlling for total export share, the exposure 
to North America and Asia especially worsened firm performance in the crisis. 
The number and concentration of export destination also seem to matter. In 
Column 4, one-area export destination dummy is significantly negative while 
four-or-more-area export destination dummy is significantly positive. In Column 5, 
the intersection of the export dummy and the Herfindahl Index of export is 
significantly negative.   
The trade finance channel is supported. In Column 6, the intersection of the 
export dummy and the short-term loan-to-asset ratio, a proxy of trade finance, is 
negative and significant. 
 Tables 5b and 5c show the estimation results for the two sub-periods. The export 
dummy and the export share are not significant in the first sub-period, but 
significantly positive in the last sub-period. The shares of exports to North America 
and Asia are negative and significant only for the last sub-period. The number and 
concentration of export destination are also significant only in the last sub-period. The 
liquidity ratio is significantly negative for the last sub-period. The corporate bond and 
CP dummies are significantly positive for the last period. The loan-to-asset ratio is 
significantly negative in the last period. The proxy of trade credit is significant in the 
first sub-period. The shares owned by foreign investors are significantly positive in 
both periods.   
 In sum, as for the trade channel, the composition and concentration of export 
markets matter rather than total export as a ratio of sales. As for the financial 
channels, market participants seemed to have worried about credit crunch rather 
than the effects of the liquidity dry-up in capital markets. We did not find evidence 




We check the robustness of our results for CAR in two ways. 
First, we extend the estimation period of (2) that serves to construct CAR. This is 
important because if s our baseline estimation period includes some credit crisis 
effects, the estimated CAR removes too much of the “usual” effects. Specifically, we 
extend the estimation period from 225 days (one year) to 495 days (two-years). Table 6 
shows the estimation results for the newly constructed CAR for the entire window. We 
find that most of the baseline results are robust to the change in the selection of the 14 
 
pre-crisis period. Only one exception is the loan-to asset ratio, which takes less 
significant coefficients. 
In estimating (5), we implicitly assumed that the disturbances are i.i.d. In reality, 
however, the disturbances may not be homoscedastic or independent across firms. To 
correct for the bias to the standard errors caused by these possibilities, we use an 
estimator that is developed by Sefcik and Thompson (1986) and applied, e.g., by 
Forbes (2004)11. Table 7 presents the estimation result for the entire window, showing 
that the most of the results are similar to the baseline result. In particular, the shares 
of exports to North America and Asia are significantly negative and the Herfindahl 
Index of the areas to which the firm exports is also significantly negative, though the 
coefficients on the number of export destination are not monotonic. The share of 
foreigners is significantly positive as in the baseline estimation result. On the other 
hand, some variables have weaker marginal significance levels than in the baseline 
estimation result, including the intersection of the export dummy and the 
loan-to-asset ratio.   
   
8.  Conclusion 
We investigate the international transmission of the credit crisis triggered by the 
Lehman default in September 2008 using Japan’s stock market data. Using 
cumulative return (CR) during the crisis period from the day of Lehman default prior 
to the day when news on the TARP capital injection was released, we find that CR is 
negatively correlated with export-to-sales ratio, loan-to-asset ratio, and the share 
owned by foreign investors. Once we control for the market risk, however, cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) during the same period gives a different picture. CAR is not 
negatively correlated with the export share or the share owned by foreign investors, 
which imply that trade channels or portfolio-rebalance by foreigners are not a unique 
characteristic of the crisis, but can be observed in normal downturns. We find that 
CAR is negatively correlated with loan-to-asset ratio, suggesting that market 
participants worried about the credit crunch. We also find that CAR is negatively 
correlated with the shares of exports to North America and Asia after controlling for 
total exports, suggesting that the composition of export markets matters rather than 
the overall export ratio. Finally, we find that the concentration of export destination 
also matters. 
                                                  
11  In case when the stock return data is missing, we replaced them with the stock return 
predicted by (2). That is, we assumed that CAR was zero on the day when the data is missing. 
This treatment is conservative in that it underestimates, if any, the effects of firm 
characteristics on CAR.   15 
 
Some important implications can be derived from our empirical results. First, 
though Japanese economy is susceptible to trade and portfolio-rebalance shocks, those 
transmission mechanisms were not specific to the crisis. In other words, Japanese 
economy is likely to be affected by export shocks and portfolio-rebalance shocks at any 
time once they happen. That is one reason Japan was severely hit by the Lehman 
default. Second, the shares of exports to some specific markets matter during the 
crisis. Concentration of export markets may have made Japanese firms vulnerable to 
the crisis. Third, even though Japanese financial institutions incurred small losses 
from securitized products, market participants worried about the adverse effects 
through loans on firm performance. This may suggest that market participants 
recognized the losses of financial institutions from the stock price declines and their 
adverse effects on lending. In that case, a fall in stock prices during a crisis is likely to 
induce their further decline. This may be another reason Japanese stock markets saw 
large price declines during the crisis.     
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Source: Standard & Poor's
Notes: TOPIX is the Tokyo Stock Price Index, a composite stock price index of all stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange first section. 
S&P 500 includes 500 leading companies in leading industries of the U.S. economy, capturing 75% coverage of U.S. equities. 
S&P Euro represents the Europe region, including constituents from euro zone countries. It provides geographic and economic diversity over industry sectors. 














































































































































































































































































































































































Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010
Notes: Gross domestic product, constant prices (National currency)
           Newly industrialized Asian economies are composed of 4 countries: Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China.
           ASEAN-5 are composed of 5 countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
           Developing Asia are composed of 26 countriess: Republic of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, 
             Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, 
             Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand,











2007 2.363 1.947 3.186 5.819 6.346 11.373
2008 ‐1.202 0 0.757 1.795 4.716 7.687



































Notes: Rates in home corrency (inter-bank rates)











































































































































































































































































































  Source: Bank of Japan


































































































































































































































































































Source: Tokyo stock exchange



















































































































Figure 7. Cumulative returns (CR) from September 16, 2008 to October 10, 2008.
Notes:  Date 1 denotes September 16, 2008.
           Date 10 denotes September 30, 2008.


























































Figure 8. Cumulative abnormal　returns (CAR) from September 16, 2008 to October 10, 2008.
Notes:  Date 1 denotes September 16, 2008.
           Date 10 denotes September 30, 2008.





























































Table 1. Cumulative returns (CR)
Exporting firms Not exporting firms
-0.322 -0.273 ***
Liquidity-to-asset ratio_high Liquidity-to-asset ratio_low
-0.293 -0.307
Loan-to-asset ratio_high Loan-to-asset ratio_low
-0.312 -0.270 ***
Share owned by foreign investers_high Share owned by foreign investers_low
-0.311 -0.286 ***
Notes:  The values in the table indicate median for each of the subgroups for the 18 operating days. 
           We conduct non-parametric two-sample tests for the median tests.  
           *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 2. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
Exporting firms Not exporting firms
-0.085 -0.113 ***
Liquidity-to-asset ratio_high Liquidity-to-asset ratio_low
-0.104 -0.096
Loan-to-asset ratio_high Loan-to-asset ratio_low
-0.104 -0.093 *
Share owned by foreign investers_high Share owned by foreign investers_low
-0.071 -0.129 ***
Notes:  The values in the table indicate median for each of the subgroups for the 18 operating days. 
           We conduct non-parametric two-sample tests for the median tests.  
           *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.25 
 
 
Table 3a. Estimation results for CR for the entire window (from September 16, 2008 to October 10, 2008)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Export dummy -0.041 0.006 *** -0.041 0.006 *** -0.031 0.029 -0.034 0.014 ** -0.031 0.007 ***
Liquid Asset Ratio -0.030 0.025 -0.037 0.026 -0.025 0.025 -0.023 0.025 -0.025 0.025 -0.028 0.025
Loan-to-Asset Ratio -0.084 0.024 *** -0.080 0.024 *** -0.085 0.023 *** -0.086 0.023 *** -0.085 0.023 *** -0.058 0.027 **
Share of Foreigners -0.063 0.025 ** -0.053 0.026 ** -0.042 0.026 -0.043 0.026 * -0.040 0.026 -0.068 0.025 ***
Corporate bond dummy -0.004 0.007
CP dummy -0.016 0.014
Export dummy＊ share of exports in total sales -0.073 0.020 *** -0.073 0.021 *** -0.069 0.021 ***
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（North America) -0.007 0.033
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Europe) 0.016 0.036
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Asia) 0.003 0.030
1area Export dummy -0.029 0.010 ***
2area Export dummy -0.025 0.013 *
3area Export dummy -0.036 0.010 ***
Over 4area Export dummy -0.025 0.009 ***
Export dummy＊Herfindahl Index of Export 0.008 0.016
Export dummy＊short-term loans-to-asset ratio -0.101 0.048 **
Cons. -0.245 0.008 *** -0.244 0.008 *** -0.248 0.008 *** -0.248 0.008 *** -0.248 0.008 *** -0.249 0.008 ***
Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1838
F(  4,  1836) =   17.31 F(  6,  1834) =   11.86 F(  8,  1832) =   10.46 F(  8,  1832) =   10.56 F(  6,  1834) =   13.89 F(  5,  1832) =   14.91
Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.0363 R-squared     =  0.0373 R-squared     =  0.0437 R-squared     =  0.0441 R-squared     =  0.0435 R-squared     =  0.0390
Adj R-squared =  0.0342 Adj R-squared =  0.0342 Adj R-squared =  0.0395 Adj R-squared =  0.0399 Adj R-squared =  0.0404 Adj R-squared =  0.0364
Root MSE      =  .12111 Root MSE      =  .12111 Root MSE      =  .12078 Root MSE      =  .12075 Root MSE      =  .12072 Root MSE      =  .12097
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 3b. Estimation results for CR for the first sub-period (from September 16, 2008 to  September 29, 2008)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Export dummy -0.012 0.004 *** -0.012 0.004 *** 0.002 0.020 -0.015 0.009 -0.015 0.005 ***
Liquid Asset Ratio 0.033 0.017 * 0.030 0.017 * 0.036 0.017 ** 0.037 0.017 ** 0.034 0.017 ** 0.032 0.017 *
Loan-to-Asset Ratio 0.006 0.016 0.008 0.016 0.005 0.016 0.006 0.016 0.006 0.016 -0.001 0.018
Share of Foreigners -0.070 0.017 *** -0.065 0.018 *** -0.063 0.018 *** -0.065 0.018 *** -0.061 0.018 *** -0.068 0.017 ***
Corporate bond dummy -0.002 0.004
CP dummy -0.009 0.010
Export dummy＊ share of exports in total sales -0.026 0.014 * -0.028 0.014 * -0.021 0.014
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（North America) -0.018 0.022
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Europe) -0.005 0.025
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Asia) -0.009 0.020
1area Export dummy -0.005 0.007
2area Export dummy -0.019 0.009 **
3area Export dummy -0.013 0.007 *
Over 4area Export dummy -0.004 0.006
Export dummy＊Herfindahl Index of Export 0.009 0.011
Export dummy＊short-term loans-to-asset ratio 0.026 0.032
Cons. -0.028 0.005 *** -0.027 0.006 *** -0.029 0.005 *** -0.029 0.005 *** -0.029 0.005 *** -0.027 0.006 ***
Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1897
F(  4,  1895) =   10.12 F(  6,  1893) =    6.95 F(  8,  1891) =    5.62 F(  8,  1891) =    5.99 F(  6,  1893) =    7.47 F(  5,  1891) =    8.17
Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.0209 R-squared     =  0.0216 R-squared     =  0.0232 R-squared     =  0.0247 R-squared     =  0.0231 R-squared     =  0.0212
Adj R-squared =  0.0188 Adj R-squared =  0.0185 Adj R-squared =  0.0191 Adj R-squared =  0.0206 Adj R-squared =  0.0200 Adj R-squared =  0.0186
Root MSE      =   .0828 Root MSE      =  .08281 Root MSE      =  .08278 Root MSE      =  .08272 Root MSE      =  .08275 Root MSE      =  .08282
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
(4) (1) (2) (3)







Table 3c. Estimation results for CR for the last sub-period (from September 30, 2008 to  October 10, 2008)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Export dummy -0.033 0.005 *** -0.032 0.005 *** -0.036 0.025 -0.026 0.012 ** -0.027 0.006 ***
Liquid Asset Ratio -0.073 0.021 *** -0.080 0.021 *** -0.068 0.021 *** -0.068 0.021 *** -0.068 0.021 *** -0.072 0.021 ***
Loan-to-Asset Ratio -0.098 0.020 *** -0.091 0.020 *** -0.098 0.020 *** -0.099 0.020 *** -0.098 0.020 *** -0.082 0.022 ***
Share of Foreigners -0.023 0.021 -0.013 0.022 -0.005 0.022 -0.005 0.022 -0.005 0.022 -0.027 0.021
Corporate bond dummy -0.008 0.006
CP dummy -0.013 0.012
Export dummy＊ share of exports in total sales -0.060 0.017 *** -0.058 0.018 *** -0.059 0.018 ***
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（North America) 0.014 0.028
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Europe) 0.015 0.031
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Asia) 0.015 0.026
1area Export dummy -0.020 0.008 **
2area Export dummy -0.013 0.011
3area Export dummy -0.031 0.009 ***
Over 4area Export dummy -0.023 0.007 ***
Export dummy＊Herfindahl Index of Export 0.006 0.014
Export dummy＊short-term loans-to-asset ratio -0.060 0.039
Cons. -0.215 0.007 *** -0.214 0.007 *** -0.218 0.007 *** -0.218 0.007 *** -0.218 0.007 *** -0.218 0.007 ***
Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2010
F(  4,  2008) =   16.62 F(  6,  2006) =   11.66 F(  8,  2004) =   10.09 F(  8,  2004) =   10.31 F(  6,  2006) =   13.44 F(  5,  2004) =   13.59
Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.0320 R-squared     =  0.0337 R-squared     =  0.0387 R-squared     =  0.0395 R-squared     =  0.0387 R-squared     =  0.0328
Adj R-squared =  0.0301 Adj R-squared =  0.0308 Adj R-squared =  0.0349 Adj R-squared =  0.0357 Adj R-squared =  0.0358 Adj R-squared =  0.0304
Root MSE      =  .10639 Root MSE      =  .10635 Root MSE      =  .10613 Root MSE      =  .10608 Root MSE      =  .10608 Root MSE      =  .10633
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table 4．Descriptive statistics of β
Exporting firms Not exporting firms
0.802 0.490 ***
Liquidity-to-asset ratio_high Liquidity-to-asset ratio_low
0.580 0.719 ***
Loan-to-asset ratio_high Loan-to-asset ratio_low
0.644 0.645
Share owned by foreign investers_high Share owned by foreign investers_low
0.848 0.443 ***
Notes:  The values in the table indicate median for each of the subgroups.
           We conduct non-parametric two-sample tests for the median tests.  
           *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.27 
 
 
Table 5a. Estimation results for CAR for the entire window (from September 16, 2008 to October 10, 2008)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Export dummy 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.068 0.031 ** 0.042 0.015 *** 0.022 0.008 ***
Liquid Asset Ratio -0.110 0.027 *** -0.097 0.028 *** -0.113 0.027 *** -0.103 0.027 *** -0.109 0.027 *** -0.108 0.027 ***
Loan-to-Asset Ratio -0.051 0.025 ** -0.063 0.026 ** -0.051 0.025 ** -0.051 0.025 ** -0.051 0.025 ** -0.016 0.029
Share of Foreigners 0.276 0.027 *** 0.258 0.028 *** 0.254 0.028 *** 0.243 0.028 *** 0.249 0.028 *** 0.270 0.027 ***
Corporate bond dummy 0.014 0.007 *
CP dummy 0.023 0.015
Export dummy＊ share of exports in total sales 0.053 0.022 ** 0.033 0.022 0.040 0.022 *
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（North America) -0.074 0.035 **
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Europe) -0.046 0.039
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Asia) -0.076 0.032* *
1area Export dummy -0.031 0.011 ***
2area Export dummy 0.002 0.014
3area Export dummy -0.011 0.011
Over 4area Export dummy 0.024 0.009 ***
Export dummy＊Herfindahl Index of Export -0.060 0.017 ***
Export dummy＊short-term loans-to-asset ratio -0.137 0.052 ***
Cons. -0.115 0.009 *** -0.118 0.009 *** -0.113 0.009 *** -0.113 0.009 *** -0.113 0.009 *** -0.120 0.009 ***
Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1838
F(  4,  1836) =   36.79 F(  6,  1834) =   25.73 F(  8,  1832) =   20.63 F(  8,  1832) =   22.97 F(  6,  1834) =   28.43 F(  5,  1832) =   30.82
Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.0742 R-squared     =  0.0776 R-squared     =  0.0826 R-squared     =  0.0912 R-squared     =  0.0851 R-squared     =  0.0776
Adj R-squared =  0.0722 Adj R-squared =  0.0746 Adj R-squared =  0.0786 Adj R-squared =  0.0872 Adj R-squared =  0.0821 Adj R-squared =  0.0751
Root MSE      =  .12986 Root MSE      =  .12969 Root MSE      =   .1294 Root MSE      =   .1288 Root MSE      =  .12916 Root MSE      =  .12989
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 5b. Estimation results for CAR for the first sub-period (from September 16, 2008 to  September 29, 2008)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Export dummy -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.004 0.017 0.020 -0.005 0.009 -0.008 0.005
Liquid Asset Ratio 0.023 0.017 0.023 0.017 0.024 0.017 0.027 0.017 0.023 0.017 0.022 0.017
Loan-to-Asset Ratio 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.005 0.018
Share of Foreigners -0.018 0.017 -0.017 0.018 -0.018 0.018 -0.022 0.018 -0.017 0.018 -0.016 0.017
Corporate bond dummy 0.001 0.004
CP dummy -0.003 0.010
Export dummy＊ share of exports in total sales -0.006 0.014 -0.011 0.014 -0.003 0.014
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（North America) -0.029 0.022
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Europe) -0.015 0.024
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Asia) -0.022 0.020
1area Export dummy -0.006 0.007
2area Export dummy -0.016 0.009 *
3area Export dummy -0.010 0.007
Over 4area Export dummy 0.003 0.006
Export dummy＊Herfindahl Index of Export 0.000 0.011
Export dummy＊short-term loans-to-asset ratio 0.021 0.032
Cons. -0.009 0.005 * -0.009 0.005 * -0.009 0.005 * -0.010 0.005 * -0.009 0.005 * -0.008 0.006
Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1900 Number of obs =    1897
F(  4,  1895) =    1.68 F(  6,  1893) =    1.14 F(  8,  1891) =    1.08 F(  8,  1891) =    1.63 F(  6,  1893) =    1.13 F(  5,  1891) =    1.41
Prob > F      =  0.1525 Prob > F      =  0.3381 Prob > F      =  0.3722 Prob > F      =  0.1104 Prob > F      =  0.3433 Prob > F      =  0.2164
R-squared     =  0.0035 R-squared     =  0.0036 R-squared     =  0.0046 R-squared     =  0.0069 R-squared     =  0.0036 R-squared     =  0.0037
Adj R-squared =  0.0014 Adj R-squared =  0.0004 Adj R-squared =  0.0003 Adj R-squared =  0.0027 Adj R-squared =  0.0004 Adj R-squared =  0.0011
Root MSE      =  .08214 Root MSE      =  .08218 Root MSE      =  .08219 Root MSE      =  .08209 Root MSE      =  .08218 Root MSE      =  .08216
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Table 5c. Estimation results for CAR for the last sub-period (from September 30, 2008 to  October 10, 2008)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Export dummy 0.012 0.005 ** 0.011 0.005 ** 0.062 0.028 ** 0.043 0.013 *** 0.024 0.007 ***
Liquid Asset Ratio -0.142 0.023 *** -0.130 0.023 *** -0.146 0.023 *** -0.138 0.023 *** -0.142 0.023 *** -0.140 0.023 ***
Loan-to-Asset Ratio -0.062 0.021 *** -0.072 0.022 *** -0.062 0.021 *** -0.062 0.021 *** -0.062 0.021 ** -0.030 0.024
Share of Foreigners 0.296 0.023 *** 0.278 0.024 *** 0.274 0.024 *** 0.266 0.024 *** 0.269 0.024 *** 0.290 0.023 ***
Corporate bond dummy 0.011 0.006 *
CP dummy 0.028 0.013 **
Export dummy＊ share of exports in total sales 0.056 0.019 *** 0.039 0.020 ** 0.041 0.019 **
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（North America) -0.065 0.031 **
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Europe) -0.045 0.034
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Asia) -0.067 0.028* *
1area Export dummy -0.026 0.009 ***
2area Export dummy 0.011 0.012
3area Export dummy -0.007 0.010
Over 4area Export dummy 0.023 0.008 ***
Export dummy＊Herfindahl Index of Export -0.059 0.015 ***
Export dummy＊short-term loans-to-asset ratio -0.124 0.042 ***
Cons. -0.111 0.007 *** -0.114 0.007 *** -0.108 0.007 *** -0.109 0.007 *** -0.109 0.007 *** -0.115 0.008 ***
Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2013 Number of obs =    2010
F(  4,  2008) =   62.36 F(  6,  2006) =   43.15 F(  8,  2004) =   33.93 F(  8,  2004) =   36.61 F(  6,  2006) =   46.91 F(  5,  2004) =   51.56
Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.1105 R-squared     =  0.1143 R-squared     =  0.1193 R-squared     =  0.1275 R-squared     =  0.1230 R-squared     =  0.1140
Adj R-squared =  0.1087 Adj R-squared =  0.1117 Adj R-squared =  0.1158 Adj R-squared =  0.1240 Adj R-squared =  0.1204 Adj R-squared =  0.1118
Root MSE      =  .11618 Root MSE      =  .11599 Root MSE      =  .11572 Root MSE      =  .11518 Root MSE      =  .11541 Root MSE      =  .11597
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table 6. Estimation results for CAR for the entire window (from September 16, 2008 to October 10, 2008)
The pre-crisis period as the 2 years before the crisis period
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Export dummy 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.061 0.031 ** 0.032 0.014 ** 0.016 0.008 **
Liquid Asset Ratio -0.082 0.027 *** -0.070 0.027 ** -0.084 0.027 *** -0.075 0.027 *** -0.081 0.027 *** -0.080 0.027 ***
Loan-to-Asset Ratio -0.035 0.025 -0.046 0.026 * -0.036 0.025 -0.036 0.025 -0.035 0.025 0.000 0.028
Share of Foreigners 0.237 0.027 *** 0.219 0.028 *** 0.218 0.028 *** 0.207 0.028 *** 0.213 0.028 *** 0.231 0.027 ***
Corporate bond dummy 0.011 0.007
CP dummy 0.025 0.015
Export dummy＊ share of exports in total sales 0.046 0.022 ** 0.027 0.022 0.034 0.022
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（North America) -0.073 0.035 **
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Europe) -0.049 0.038
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Asia) -0.072 0.031* *
1area Export dummy -0.032 0.011 ***
2area Export dummy -0.004 0.014
3area Export dummy -0.017 0.011
Over 4area Export dummy 0.019 0.009 **
Export dummy＊Herfindahl Index of Export -0.053 0.017 ***
Export dummy＊short-term loans-to-asset ratio -0.138 0.051 ***
Cons. -0.106 0.009 *** -0.108 0.009 *** -0.104 0.009 *** -0.104 0.009 *** -0.104 0.009 *** -0.111 0.009 ***
Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1841 Number of obs =    1838
F(  4,  1836) =   25.03 F(  6,  1834) =   17.67 F(  8,  1832) =   14.28 F(  8,  1832) =   16.44 F(  6,  1834) =   19.66 F(  5,  1832) =   21.55
Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000 Prob > F      =  0.0000
R-squared     =  0.0517 R-squared     =  0.0547 R-squared     =  0.0587 R-squared     =  0.0670 R-squared     =  0.0604 R-squared     =  0.0555
Adj R-squared =  0.0496 Adj R-squared =  0.0516 Adj R-squared =  0.0546 Adj R-squared =  0.0629 Adj R-squared =  0.0573 Adj R-squared =  0.0529
Root MSE      =   .1288 Root MSE      =  .12867 Root MSE      =  .12846 Root MSE      =   .1279 Root MSE      =  .12827 Root MSE      =  .12858
Note: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.





Table7. The Impact of the firm characteristics on abnormal returns for the entire window (from September 16, 2008 to October 10, 2008)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Export dummy 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Liquid Asset Ratio -0.007 0.003 ** -0.006 0.003 * -0.007 0.003 ** -0.007 0.003 ** -0.007 0.003 ** -0.007 0.003 **
Loan-to-Asset Ratio -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.002
Share of Foreigners 0.014 0.005 *** 0.012 0.005 *** 0.012 0.005 ** 0.012 0.005 ** 0.012 0.005 ** 0.013 0.005 ***
Corporate bond dummy 0.001 0.000 **
CP dummy 0.001 0.001
Export dummy＊ share of exports in total sales 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（North America) -0.008 0.003 ***
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Europe) -0.007 0.003 **
Export dummy＊shares of exports in total exports（Asia) -0.006 0.002* * *
1area Export dummy -0.001 0.001 **
2area Export dummy 0.000 0.001
3area Export dummy -0.002 0.001 **
Over 4area Export dummy 0.000 0.001
Export dummy＊Herfindahl Index of Export -0.002 0.001 *
Export dummy＊short-term loans-to-asset ratio -0.003 0.004
Cons. -0.006 0.002 *** -0.006 0.002 *** -0.006 0.002 *** -0.006 0.002 *** -0.006 0.002 *** -0.006 0.002 ***
Notes: We use the estimator developed by Seficik and Thomoson(1986) and Forbes(2004).
         * , **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.




Export dummy takes on the value 1 if the firm
exports and 0 if the firm doesn't export.
Basic Survey of Japanese
Business Structure and
Activities (BSJBSA), Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry




(Short-term Loans + Long-term Loans) /　Total
Assets
Corporate Financial Databank,
Development Bank of Japan
Share of Foreigners Shareholdings by foreign investors NEEDS-Cges
Corporate bond dummy
Corporate bond (CB) dummy takes on the value




CP dummy takes on the value 1 if the firm
issues CP and 0 if the firm doesn't issue CP.
BSJBSA
Share of exports in total sales Total Exports / Total Sales BSJBSA
Shares of exports in total exports（North Exports to North America / Total Exports BSJBSA
Shares of exports in total exports（Europe) Exports to Europe / Total Exports BSJBSA
Shares of exports in total exports（Asia) Exports to Asia / Total Exports BSJBSA
Short-term loan-to-asset ratio Short-term Loans /　Total Assets Corporate Financial Databank